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RFRA AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:
DOES THE CONTRACEPTION MANDATE
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
EMPLOYERS?
Alisa Lalana
I. INTRODUCTION
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell1 is the
most recent case to address the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)
contraception mandate within the confines of the problematic
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). Congress
enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Employment Division v. Smith,2 which limited the scope of the
Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause.3 Prior to Smith, courts applied
an expansive interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, finding any
law which substantially burdened a religious belief unconstitutional
unless the government had a “compelling interest” and “no
alternative forms of regulation could be used to advance that
interest.”4 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise
 J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. International
Relations, University of Southern California, May 2009. Thank you to Professor Aaron Caplan
for his invaluable guidance and feedback during the writing process, the members of the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work and dedication, and my family for their
unconditional support.
1. 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015).
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3. Andrew Swindle, Virgin Mary or Mary Magdalene: An Examination of the
Contraceptive Mandate Cases and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s Substantial Burden
Standard, 66 ALA. L. REV. 925, 929 (2015).
4. Micah Schwartzman et al., The New Law of Religion: Hobby Lobby Rewrites ReligiousFreedom Law in Ways That Ignore Everything That Came Before, SLATE (July 3, 2014, 11:54
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/07/after_hobby
_lobby_there_is_only_rfra_and_that_s_all_you_need.html; see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (holding that an employer violated a Seventh-Day Adventist’s ability to freely exercise her
religion by firing her when she refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin’s compulsory public school
attendance law violated members of the Amish faith’s rights to freely exercise their religion by
refusing to send their children, aged fourteen and fifteen, to public school after the completion of
eighth grade).
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Clause did not apply to neutral laws that were generally applicable to
the public because any resulting religious burden would be incidental
and unintentional.5 Worried by this perceived reduction in
constitutional protection, Congress attempted to restore pre-Smith
levels of protection against religious discrimination. Consequently,
RFRA established religious exemptions to any federal regulation
(generally applicable or otherwise) imposing a “substantial burden”
on religious beliefs where the government fails to prove it was
(1) the least restrictive method of furthering a (2) compelling
government interest.6 Despite Congress’s good intentions to restore
religious liberty protections, the courts’ interpretation of RFRA has
exceeded the statute’s intended reach. Courts have allowed RFRA to
become a vehicle for religious groups to undermine federal laws and
evade compliance with those laws by drastically lowering the
threshold to raise a discrimination claim.7 To monitor and invalidate
discriminatory laws on the state level, several states have followed
Congress’s lead and enacted their own state versions of RFRA.8
These state RFRAs generally follow the same framework as the
federal law and therefore are at risk of the same over-reaching
judicial interpretation.9
Since its enactment, the ACA’s contraception mandate has given
rise to a number of federal RFRA claims.10 The mandate requires
employers of over fifty full-time employees to provide comprehensive healthcare plans to their employees.11 These plans must
include methods of contraception such as Plan B (the “morning after
pill”).12 Little Sisters addressed whether the statutory process for
religious groups to opt out of this requirement imposed a “substantial
burden,” and whether the government failed to establish a

5. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
6. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) [hereinafter
RFRA].
7. Id.
8. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATORS (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state
-rfra-legislation.aspx [hereinafter 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation].
9. Id.
10. Status of the Lawsuits Challenging the Affordable Care Act’s Birth Control Coverage
Benefit, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files
/pdfs/contraceptive_coverage_litigation_status_10-27-15.pdf (“Over 100 lawsuits have been filed
in federal court challenging the Affordable Care Act’s birth control coverage benefit.”).
11. Swindle, supra note 3, at 927, 931.
12. Id.
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compelling interest to justify that burden under the federal RFRA.13
The opt-out process requires objecting religious organizations to
notify Health and Human Services (HHS) of their faith-based
inability to comply, which then shifts the responsibility to provide
the required coverage to the third-party administrator (TPA)14 or
health insurer.15
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a correct decision in
deciding that the opt-out process built into the law did not
substantially burden the Little Sisters’ religious beliefs.16 However,
the Court of Appeals could only accomplish this by choosing to not
follow the Supreme Court’s logic in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.17 This was a correct decision because Hobby Lobby’s
interpretation of RFRA is unworkable: it greatly diminishes the
threshold requirement to bring a RFRA claim by removing the
court’s ability to fully measure the substantiality of a burden. The
better approach is to replace RFRA’s “substantial burden” test and
instead follow the reasonable accommodation framework used in
employment law under Title VII. Little Sisters is a step in the right
direction, but ultimately it will take amendments to both federal and
state RFRAs to fully correct the problem.
Part II of this Note discusses the history of religious exemptions
and the evolution of how courts have applied them. It focuses on
Congress’s motivation in creating RFRA and how the jurisprudence
has developed—particularly after the enactment of the ACA. Part III
then addresses the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Little Sisters and
discusses its departure from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hobby
Lobby. It focuses on how the Hobby Lobby interpretation has made
RFRA unworkable. Part IV then analyzes the needed changes to
RFRA. It proposes the borrowing of “reasonable accommodation”
analysis from Title VII used in employment law to determine the
validity of a RFRA claim. Part V then addresses the further need to
apply the proposed “reasonable accommodation” analysis from
13. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir.
2015).
14. Id. at 1165–66. (A TPA is a person or company hired by an employer to manage the
company’s insurance plans. The TPA’s role can range from claim service provider, performing
ministerial duties or processing claims, to administrator of claims for reimbursements from
employees, having the discretion to make important plan decisions.).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1195.
17. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014).
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Part IV to state RFRA laws as well as the federal RFRA. Part VI
concludes reiterating the need to apply Title VII framework to all
RFRA laws.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
A. The Constitution and the Free Exercise Clause
Under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”18 In Employment Division
v. Smith, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Free Exercise
Clause by holding that it does not apply to religiously-neutral laws of
general applicability.19 There, two members of the Native American
Church were fired from their jobs after testing positive for peyote,
which they ingested during a church ceremony for sacramental
purposes.20 Subsequently, the state of Oregon denied those members’
applications for unemployment benefits because testing positive for
illegal drugs constituted “misconduct,” which rendered them
ineligible for benefits.21
The Supreme Court held that because the Oregon statute made
no mention of religious practices, it was not an attempt to “regulate
religious beliefs,” but rather a neutral law of general applicability
targeting drug use as a whole.22 Therefore, the Court concluded there
was no violation of the Free Exercise Clause and that strict scrutiny
need not be applied.23 Strict scrutiny involves analyzing whether a
law is narrowly tailored—i.e., the least restrictive means possible—
to achieve a compelling government interest.24
The Smith Court determined that although federal laws cannot
directly interfere with religious beliefs and opinions, religious
practices can be incidentally burdened.25 It explained that allowing
individuals to violate federal law to adhere to their religious beliefs
would be akin to making professed religious doctrines “superior to
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id. at 907–08.
Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879)).
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the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself.”26 The Court therefore held that the Oregon statute
did not violate the Constitution, which “does not grant a right to
religious exemptions from general legal obligations” when religious
practices are incidentally burdened.27 Rather, the Free Exercise
Clause “provide[s] a shield against religious discrimination,” only
when a law is specifically directed at a religious practice.28
Three years after its decision in Smith, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed and applied this interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.29 There, a
Santeria church, whose practices involved animal sacrifice, obtained
the proper permits to establish a church in the City of Hialeah,
Florida.30 Shortly thereafter, the City called an emergency City
Council meeting and passed an ordinance banning animal sacrifice.31
The Court held that this was not a religiously-neutral ordinance and
was clearly created to specifically prohibit the Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye’s practices.32 It looked to the minutes of the City
Council meeting, which “evidence[d] significant hostility exhibited
by residents, members of the city council, and other city officials
toward the Santeria religion and its practice of animal sacrifice.”33
One councilmember in support of the ordinance even referred to
Santeria devotees at the Church as being “in violation of everything
this country stands for.”34
Therefore, the Court applied strict scrutiny to establish whether
the law violated the Free Exercise Clause.35 To do this, it analyzed
whether the City (1) had a compelling government interest that
justified the burden on the Church, and (2) whether it was furthering
that interest in the least restrictive way possible.36 The Court then
determined that the government interest to prevent animal sacrifice
was not sufficiently compelling and thus found the ordinance
26. Id.
27. James M. Oleske, Jr., Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty
and Animal Welfare Laws, 19 ANIMAL L. 295, 297 (2013).
28. Id.
29. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
30. Id. at 526.
31. Id. at 522, 526.
32. Id. at 526.
33. Id. at 541.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 522.
36. Id.
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unconstitutional.37
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)
Religious groups, Congress, and even secular civil liberties
groups strongly opposed the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith,
fearing it created a loophole for Congress to pass discriminatory
laws.38 As a response, RFRA was immediately proposed as a way to
reinstate the strict scrutiny analysis beyond laws that target religious
practices, and restore its additional application to neutral laws of
general applicability.39
Under RFRA, the first aspect of the court’s role is to decide
whether the challenged law substantially burdens a plaintiff’s ability
to freely exercise his or her sincerely held religious beliefs.40
Although RFRA does not define a “substantial burden,” it explicitly
references the Supreme Court’s framework for determining a burden
under the Free Exercise Clause.41 Specifically, in discussing the Free
Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has said that a substantial
burden is imposed when a law conditions a “governmental benefit
upon conduct that would violate [someone’s] religious beliefs.”42
Once a plaintiff has established a substantial burden on religious
exercise, the burden of proof shifts to the government to show that
the law (1) “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest,”
and (2) “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”43
C. Creation of State RFRAs
Originally, the federal RFRA was applicable to both federal and
state laws.44 However, in City of Boerne v. Flores,45 the Supreme
37. Id. at 530.
38. The ACLU and Freedom of Religion and Belief, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/aclu-and
-freedom-religion-and-belief (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
39. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 530.
40. La. Coll. v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 766, 778 (W.D. La. 2014).
41. Id.
42. RFRA, supra note 6 (citing Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv. 535 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th
Cir. 2008)).
43. Eugene Volokh, What Is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2, 2013, 7:43 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/12/02/1a-religious-freedom
-restoration-act.
44. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, supra note 8 (referencing City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), in which the Court stated that RFRA no longer applies to
the states).
45. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Court overturned RFRA as applied to state law on the ground that the
federal government “can regulate its own actions” but “cannot
interpret the substantive meaning of the Constitution.”46 Therefore,
the Court held that applying a federal law like RFRA to the states
exceeded Congress’s constitutionally-granted authority.47
Subsequently, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal,48 the Court confirmed that RFRA still applied to
federal laws.49 There, it granted an injunction for a religious group
who received communion by drinking hoasca tea, which contained a
hallucinogenic prohibited under Schedule 1 of the Controlled
Substance Act (CSA).50 In applying the strict scrutiny analysis
required by RFRA, the Court found that the government failed to
meet its burden of showing a compelling government interest; the
Court therefore required a religious exemption to the CSA for the
religious group.51
After the Supreme Court decided in Boerne that RFRA only
applies to federal laws, many states reacted by creating their own
religious freedom laws.52 Currently, twenty-one states have their own
state RFRAs,53 and twelve additional states have plans to introduce
similar legislation.54 These laws are modeled after the federal RFRA
and require the same substantial burden test.55 However, some states
have created even stricter requirements. Arkansas, for example, does
not just require a compelling government interest to justify a state
law as the federal RFRA does, but goes further to define a
compelling interest as an interest of the “highest magnitude.”56
46. Kathleen Sands, Territory, Wilderness, Property, and Reservation: Land and Religion in
Native American Supreme Court Cases, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253, 308 (2012).
47. City of Boerne, 521 U.S at 536.
48. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
49. Id. at 439.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, supra note 8.
53. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.
Those states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Id.
54. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, supra note 8 (“Colorado,
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West
Virginia and Wyoming are looking to add a RFRA or similar law to their state’s laws.”).
55. Id.
56. Howard M. Friedman, 10 Things You Need to Know to Really Understand RFRA in
Indiana and Arkansas, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts
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D. The Affordable Care Act and Its Contraception Mandate
The ACA was created in 2010 as a combination of two separate
pieces of legislation: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act57 and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010.58 The resulting ACA included a contraception mandate
requiring employers of fifty or more full-time employees to provide
health insurance plans that meet minimum standards of coverage.
One of those minimum standards of coverage requires provision of
preventative care for women without any cost to the insured.59 The
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), charged
with defining the specific preventative care standards, ultimately
required coverage of all FDA-approved contraceptive methods and
sterilization procedures, as well as patient education and counseling
for women with reproductive capacity.60
In creating this contraception mandate, the legislative and
executive branches attempted to improve women’s health while
significantly reducing healthcare costs.61 Studies show that even
“moderate co-pays can cause women with low and moderate
incomes to forego contraceptive services,” and in a 2009 survey,
“twenty-three percent of women reported having difficulty affording
birth control and twenty-four percent reported postponing a birth
control or gynecological visit due to cost.”62 Because employerprovided healthcare coverage constituted fifty-nine percent of total
healthcare coverage in 2012, the success of the ACA hinges on the
government’s ability to target these plans and acquire the support and
willingness of employers.63
-of-faith/wp/2015/04/01/10-things-you-need-to-know-to-really-understand-rfra-in-indiana-and
-arkansas.
57. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 120 (2010).
58. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305); Coverage of Certain Preventative Services
Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51092 (Aug. 27, 2014).
59. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir.
2015).
60. Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 785
(2015).
61. Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Union of Contraceptive Services and the Affordable Care
Act Gives Birth to First Amendment Concerns, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 539, 540–541 (2013);
Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RES. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov
/womensguidelines.
62. Tenenbaum, supra note 61, at 540–41.
63. Jeremy Thomas Harbaugh, Recent Case Developments: Federal Appellate Court Holds
That a For-Profit Corporation Can Challenge the Contraception Mandate Under the RFRA, 39
AM. J.L. & MED. 692, 695 (2013) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFF., ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE
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E. Hobby Lobby’s Interpretation of the ACA and RFRA
In Hobby Lobby, the plaintiff owners of closely held
corporations alleged that the ACA’s requirement that they provide
their employees with healthcare policies covering certain types of
contraception substantially burdened their religious beliefs and thus
violated RFRA.64 After determining that a closely held corporation
qualified as “person” under RFRA,65 the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs were substantially burdened by the ACA’s contraception
mandate and thus the onus shifted to the government to prove that
the statute was the least restrictive method of furthering a compelling
government interest.66
The Court held that the government failed to prove the
contraception mandate was the least restrictive means available to
achieve its interest of providing affordable and comprehensive
healthcare coverage to all Americans.67 The majority felt that the
government could have easily narrowed the statute to provide forprofit companies like Hobby Lobby with the same exemptions
already offered to churches and religious non-profits.68
Consequently, the Court held that the contraception mandate
imposed an unjustified substantial burden, thus requiring a religious
exemption.69
The main flaw in the Hobby Lobby decision is that the Court
found it beyond its purview to address the magnitude of a religious
burden, despite the fact that RFRA specifically requires courts to
analyze whether a burden is “substantial.”70 It viewed the question of
substantiality to be one of “religion and moral philosophy,” which
courts are not in a position to address.71 Furthermore, the Court
reiterated previous warnings that “‘courts must not presume to

COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME
COURT DECISION, at tbl. 3 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011
-2012/reports/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf.
64. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (2014).
65. Id. at 2679.
66. See id. at 2785–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 2786.
68. Id.; see Fact Sheet: Women’s Preventive Services Coverage, Non-Profit Religious
Organizations, and Closely-Held For-Profit Entities, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS.
OVERSIGHT, https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/womens-preven
-02012013.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2015).
69. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
70. Id. at 2778; see RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
71. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778.
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determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim.’”72 Although it has
long been agreed that courts cannot address the plausibility of a
religious belief, here, the Supreme Court incorrectly equated this
analysis with measuring the magnitude of the burden.73 Instead, it
considered a RFRA claim to be established simply because the
plaintiffs had a religious belief, and it then accepted their contention
that the burden was substantial.74
The Hobby Lobby decision was controversial in part because it
was seen as an attempt to “corporatize religious liberty,” applying
exemptions to private companies that were traditionally reserved for
churches and non-profits.75 Beyond this, however, the Court’s
interpretation of the substantial burden test creates even greater
jurisprudential issues. It renders the term “substantial,” as written in
the statute, completely meaningless.76
By merging the analysis regarding the magnitude of the burden
with analysis of the reasonableness of a religious belief—which
federal courts are forbidden to undertake—the Court set an
unworkable precedent and paved the way for conflicting case law.77
F. Post-Hobby Lobby Changes to the ACA
At the time of Hobby Lobby, the options available to a religious
for-profit organization were either to simply comply with the
regulation or pay a fine for non-compliance.78 The Supreme Court
then made its Hobby Lobby ruling, applying the existing opt-out for
non-profits to for-profits.79
Shortly after making this decision, the Supreme Court heard a
motion for a preliminary injunction in Wheaton College v. Burwell80
and amended its interpretation of the existing opt-out process.
Previously, organizations eligible to opt out were required to
complete Employee Benefit Security Administration (EBSA) Form

72. Id. (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990);
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969)).
73. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Schwartzman et al., supra note 4.
76. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 2775.
79. Id. at 2769–70.
80. 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
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700 and send copies to the health insurance company or TPA.81 In
Wheaton College, the court simplified the process, requiring only
that:
[i]f the applicant informs the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in writing that it is a non-profit
organization that holds itself out as religious and has
religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptive
services, the respondents are enjoined from enforcing
against the applicant the challenged provisions of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related
regulations pending final disposition of appellate review.82
This required notification can be sent to HHS via letter or email
and must, at a minimum, contain:
(1) the name of the eligible organization and the basis on
which it qualifies for an accommodation; (2) its objection
based on sincerely held religious beliefs to providing
coverage of some or all contraceptive services, including
any particular subset to which it objects; (3) the name and
type of the group health plan; and (4) the name and contact
information for any of the plan’s TPAs and/or health
insurance issuers.83
This requirement of notifying HHS is the provision at issue in
Little Sisters.84
III. LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR HOME FOR THE AGED
A. Little Sisters of the Poor and Its RFRA Claim
In Little Sisters, three groups of plaintiffs filed suit against the
government regarding the religious opt-out provision of the ACA:
Little Sisters of the Poor, Southern Nazarene, and Reaching Souls.85
Each group alleged that it was “substantially burdened” by the
requirement to notify either HHS or its health insurance provider that

81. Id. at 2807.
82. Id.; see also Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2924 (2015) (reiterating that notification to
HHS is sufficient and plaintiffs need not complete form 700).
83. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir.
2015) (quoting Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 51092 (Aug. 27, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84. Id. at 1160.
85. Id. at 1167–69.
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it could not comply with the regulation for religious reasons.86
One group, the Little Sisters of the Poor, belongs to an order of
Catholic nuns who devote their lives to caring for the elderly. 87 The
organization provides health insurance to its employees through the
Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust; the TPA for this
organization is another Catholic organization, Christian Brothers
Services.88 Its health insurance plans have always excluded
“coverage of sterilization, contraception, and abortifacients . . . in
accordance with their religious belief that deliberately avoiding
reproduction through medical means is immoral.”89 Little Sisters
argued that the opt-out process included in the ACA still made it
complicit in the provision of contraceptives and therefore imposed a
“substantial burden.” 90 This is because in accordance with its
religious beliefs, it “cannot take actions that directly cause others to
provide contraception or appear to participate in the Department’s
delivery scheme.”91
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado originally
denied Little Sisters an injunction. It held that the minor
administrative task of notifying HHS and the TPA92 of its request to
opt out did not impose a “substantial burden” on the nuns’ religious
beliefs, and it contrasted Little Sisters’ situation with that in Hobby
Lobby where no opt-out accommodation scheme existed for private
for-profit corporations.93
The second and third groups of plaintiffs also made legally
similar claims to that of Little Sisters in that they argued complying
with the opt-out process would violate their religious beliefs by
making them morally complicit in the provision of contraception to
their employees.94 However, when their claims were originally
86. Id. at 1159.
87. Id. at 1167.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 1168.
91. Id.
92. At the time of the district’s court decision, the Supreme Court had not yet heard Wheaton
College and simplified the opt-out process. Little Sisters appealed to the Supreme Court and was
granted an injunction that instead only required them to notify HHS of its religious objections. Id.
at 1170.
93. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1237 (D.
Colo. 2013).
94. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1168; S. Nazarene Univ. v. Sebelius, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
179569, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013); Reaching Souls Int’l, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. CIV-131092-D, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178752, at *26 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013).
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heard, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma—referencing the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hobby
Lobby—granted injunctions, finding that the opt-out process did
violate RFRA.95 In both cases, the district court ruled that the
plaintiffs were “substantially burdened” because the opt-out
provision required them to “violate their belief that participating in or
facilitating the accommodation [was] the moral equivalent of directly
complying with the contraceptive mandate.”96
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision
The Tenth Circuit then consolidated the three plaintiffs’ cases on
appeal.97 Because the RFRA analysis follows a burden-shifting
framework,98 the court first focused on whether the plaintiffs
established a prima facie RFRA claim, which requires the plaintiff to
establish “(1) a substantial burden imposed by the federal
government on a (2) sincere (3) exercise of religion.”99 Based on this
structure of analysis, the court first had to determine whether the
plaintiffs were “substantially burdened.”100
The court determined that the most important aspect of the
analysis is not deciding whether a burden on the plaintiffs exists at
all, but whether a burden is substantial.101 Focusing on the need for a
legal definition of “substantial,” it pointed out that “[i]f plaintiffs
could assert and establish that a burden is ‘substantial’ without any
possibility of judicial scrutiny, the word ‘substantial’ would become
wholly devoid of independent meaning.”102 Accordingly, it held that
the ACA’s process to opt out is “among the common and permissible
methods of religious accommodation in a pluralist society, and does
not constitute a substantial burden under RFRA.”103
In so holding, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that
notifying HHS made them complicit with providing contraception

95. See S. Nazarene Univ., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179569, at *22–26; Reaching Souls Int’l,
Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178752, at *26.
96. Reaching Souls Int’l, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178752, at *26.
97. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1151, 1169.
98. Id. at 1175.
99. Id. (quoting Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2001)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1176.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1180–81; see also United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 960 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“Law accommodates religion; it cannot wholly exempt religion from the reach of the law.”).
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and abortions, deciding that the plaintiffs’ roles were not causal.104
Rather, the federal government obligates providing contraception and
preventive care coverage and the opt-out provision simply shifts the
burden of complying with that law.105 Furthermore, the requirements
under the accommodation scheme are simply “de minimis
administrative burdens,”106 which are allowable under the pre-Smith
standards restored by RFRA.107 Because the court held there was no
substantial burden, it did not need to apply strict scrutiny to
determine whether the government had proved that a compelling
interest was being furthered in the least restrictive way possible.108
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Deviation from Hobby Lobby
Although the Tenth Circuit made many attempts to factually
distinguish Little Sisters from Hobby Lobby,109 the legal issues
addressed remained the same, although they were applied in different
ways. The court correctly acknowledged that the most recent
religious discrimination cases decided by the Tenth Circuit and
Supreme Court110—Hobby Lobby,111 Yellowbear v. Lampert,112
Ahdulhaseehb v. Calbone,113 and Holt v. Hobbs114—differed from
Little Sisters in that those cases involved laws of general
applicability that included no religious accommodation.115 By
contrast, a religious accommodation not only existed but was the
central issue of the plaintiffs’ claims in Little Sisters.116
104. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1182–84.
105. Id. at 1182.
106. Id. at 1175.
107. Id. Upon its creation, it was determined that the ACA’s religious accommodation
scheme would require “that each of the estimated 122 organizations [would] spend approximately
50 minutes in preparation time and incur $0.54 mailing cost to satisfy [its] requirements.”
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51092,
51097 (Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
108. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1195.
109. Id. at 1160.
110. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2012).
111. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (where a Muslim prisoner’s request for a halal diet was denied).
112. 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014).
113. 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010).
114. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (where a Muslim prisoner was not allowed to grow a beard in
compliance with his faith and even his requests for a compromise to grow a short beard were
denied).
115. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1171–72. Other than Hobby Lobby, these cases all involved
claims for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), which requires the same showing of a “substantial burden” on a religious practice. 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2012).
116. Id. at 1160.
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Despite this important factual difference, all of these cases
hinged on determining whether a “substantial burden” had been
imposed.117 While the Supreme Court has indicated that the existence
of an accommodation scheme can lessen the burden on a plaintiff,118
the basic structure of analysis to be taken in each of these cases
remains the same. The real issue is the absence of a clear “substantial
burden” framework to guide courts.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby also argued that
paying for a healthcare plan covering abortions and contraceptives
made them complicit in acts that their religious beliefs disallowed.119
The government (and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent) unsuccessfully
argued that this complicity connection was too attenuated and that
“providing the coverage would not itself result in the destruction of
an embryo.”120 In Hobby Lobby, however, the Supreme Court held
that in making this argument, HHS and the dissent were asking the
Court to analyze the reasonableness of the religious belief—which
federal courts “have no business addressing”121—rather than the
substantiality of the burden.122
The Tenth Circuit in Little Sisters relied on precisely the same
attenuation argument regarding complicity as HHS and the dissent in
Hobby Lobby, which the Court rejected.123 The Little Sisters court,
however, used that same argument to determine that a substantial
burden did not exist and ultimately conclude that “[p]laintiffs d[id]
not ‘trigger’ or otherwise cause contraceptive coverage because
federal law, not the act of opting out, entitle[d] plan participants and
beneficiaries to coverage.”124 Furthermore, “[a]lthough Plaintiffs
allege[d] the administrative tasks required to opt out of the Mandate
ma[de] them complicit in the overall delivery scheme, opting out
instead relieve[d] them from complicity.”125 But this is no different
117. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775
(2014); Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1178; Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55; Ahdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at
1315–19.
118. See Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1160 (citing Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759; Yellowbear,
741 F.3d at 56).
119. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (“If the owners comply with the HHS mandate,
they believe they will be facilitating abortions . . . .”).
120. Id. (quoting Brief for the Petitioners at 31–34, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354)); id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2778.
122. Id.
123. Id.; Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1178–80.
124. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1173.
125. Id. at 1173–74.
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than the dissent’s rejected argument in Hobby Lobby—that the
insurance plans provide contraception and abortions, not the
employers providing the plan.126
It is true the employers in Little Sisters were in fact removed one
step further from these actions than were the employers in Hobby
Lobby. The Hobby Lobby employers sought an exemption from
compliance with the actual contraception mandate, whereas the Little
Sisters employers sought an exemption from the opt-out process. For
this reason, the Little Sisters court logically argued that those
plaintiffs suffered less of a burden.127 The problem, however, is that
the mere fact that the Little Sisters court addressed this argument
goes directly against the reasoning in Hobby Lobby, where the court
explained that analyzing this complicity argument constitutes a
forbidden analysis of the reasonableness of a religious belief.128
IV. PROPOSED APPLICATION OF TITLE VII FRAMEWORK TO RFRA
A. Title VII and Reasonable Accommodation
In employment law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
governs the structure of analysis a court uses when an employee
claims religious discrimination.129 Just as the current RFRA
framework requires, Title VII requires courts to make a two-pronged
analysis.130 Under both systems, the first prong requires that a
plaintiff establish a prima facie case before the burden shifts to the
government or employer to justify their actions.131 A prima facie
case for religious discrimination under Title VII is established when
an employee shows that: (1) “he or she has a bona fide religious
belief that conflicts with an employment requirement”; (2) “he or she
informed the employer of this belief;” and (3) “he or she was
disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment
requirement.”132
126. Cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2789 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would conclude that
the connection . . . is too attenuated to rank as substantial. The requirement carries no command
that [Plaintiffs] purchase or provide the contraceptives they find objectionable. Instead, it calls on
the companies . . . to direct money into undifferentiated funds . . . under comprehensive health
plans. Those plans . . . must [then] offer contraceptive coverage without cost sharing . . . .”).
127. See Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1177–78.
128. Id.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1991).
130. Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006).
131. Id.
132. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65–66 (1986) (quoting Turpen v. Mo.-
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Once a prima facie claim is established, the second prong of
analysis shifts the burden of proof to the employer to demonstrate
that it offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee, or else
prove that it “is unable to reasonably accommodate . . . an
employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”133 There is no
set requirement for what accommodation an employer must offer, so
long as it is reasonable.134 Additionally, an accommodation is found
to cause “undue hardship” whenever “that accommodation results in
‘more than a de minimis cost’ to the employer.”135
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, diminished the
meaning of a “substantial burden” so much that the threshold
question to establish a prima facie RFRA claim is no different than
the requirement of a “bona fide religious belief” under Title VII. Yet
under Title VII, a low threshold for a plaintiff to establish a prima
facie claim is balanced out by a more difficult merits test for the
plaintiff in the latter part of the analysis, where an employer’s good
faith attempt to make a reasonable accommodation is enough to
justify its actions. If the Court is going to lower RFRA’s threshold
test and adopt the simple requirement of a “bona fide religious
belief” that conflicts with the law, it must also raise the bar in the
second prong of the analysis regarding the merits of the claim.
RFRA should be amended so that it no longer applies the current
version of the “compelling interest test.” Instead, once the burden
shifts to the government to justify its actions, just as under Title VII,
the court should look to whether the government made a good faith
effort to accommodate the plaintiffs and their religious beliefs. In
employment law, an accommodation does not have to be effective to
be reasonable; it simply has to be a legitimate attempt to work and
compromise with the employee.136 If the accommodation causes
undue hardship to the company, such accommodation is not required,
Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984)).
133. Id. at 63; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
134. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68.
135. Id. at 67 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n. 9 (1977)
(emphasis in original)); see 118 Cong. Rec. 705–06 (1972).
136. See Trans World, 432 U.S. at 66–70. The court in Trans World held that an employer
airline was not in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it failed to give an employee
Saturdays off to follow religious tenets. Id. The employer met with the employee to discuss
alternatives, attempted to find someone to swap shifts, and tried to find the employee another job.
Id. Making this legitimate attempt to work with the employee was found to be sufficient even
though it did not allow the employee to properly conduct his religious observation. Id.
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as that would cease to be “reasonable.”137 Analogizing RFRA claims
to Title VII claims, undue hardship should be equated with an
undermining of the government’s compelling interest achieved by
the law. An accommodation would be found unreasonable if it stops
the government from achieving those motivating objectives.
B. Title VII as Applied to Little Sisters
If the Tenth Circuit had used this Title VII approach in Little
Sisters, it would have first considered whether organizations had a
“bona fide religious belief” that conflicted with the ACA’s
contraception mandate. The Little Sisters would have satisfied this
first step of proving a prima facie claim, and the court would have
then looked to whether the government could justify its actions.
Within the Title VII framework, HHS would have to prove that it
either offered a reasonable accommodation to religious organizations
such as Little Sisters, or show that no accommodation could be made
without undermining the purpose of the contraception mandate.
In Little Sisters, the government offered an accommodation in
the form of an opt-out provision that would likely satisfy this
standard. Under Title VII analysis, the accommodation must be
reasonable; it need not necessarily be effective. Here, the
government offered an opt-out provision to relieve religious
organizations of the responsibility to provide healthcare coverage
conflicting with their religious beliefs. The fact that this opt out is
still not satisfactory to Little Sisters is not a crucial factor in this
analytical framework. The important consideration is that the
government made a legitimate attempt to resolve religious
organizations’ concerns. Therefore, using this Title VII-like analysis,
the Tenth Circuit would have been able to logically come to the same
conclusion—that the opt-out provision is not a violation of RFRA—
while still working within the confines of the RFRA framework.
V. APPLICATION OF TITLE VII FRAMEWORK TO STATE RFRAS
A. Differences Between the Federal RFRA and State RFRAs
Applying the above-proposed changes to the federal RFRA is
not enough to resolve the overall issue; the changes must also be
applied to state RFRAs. Due to inherent differences in federal and
137. Id.
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state laws, the existence of state RFRAs has even broader
consequences than the federal RFRA. Already, one unforeseen
consequence is that many social conservatives are now attempting to
use state RFRAs as a way to evade non-discrimination laws and
avoid providing services to members of the LGBT community and
other minority groups.138 It is in this context that the RFRAs of
Indiana and Arkansas have recently garnered a great deal of media
attention and opposition.139 These two states have some of the most
extreme language in their RFRAs, which are not necessarily
indicative of the remaining nineteen existing laws, yet they represent
a growing problem caused by the rise of state RFRAs.
Indiana Governor Mike Pence argued that Indiana’s RFRA is an
exact copy of the federal RFRA.140 However, Senator Chuck
Schumer, who authored the federal RFRA of 1993, strongly
disagreed and commented that the two laws can be considered mirror
images, “only if you’re using a Funhouse mirror.”141 The important
difference is that Indiana’s RFRA applies even in cases where the
government is not a party; it can therefore protect the discriminatory
actions of private individuals.142 Specifically, the law provides that
after an individual suffers a substantial burden on religious beliefs,
he or she may assert a RFRA violation as a claim or defense,
“regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a
party to the proceeding.”143 This greatly expands the circumstances
under which someone can claim religious freedom as a defense.144
Because of this addition to Indiana’s RFRA, many religious
groups are attempting to justify their actions and evade compliance
with non-discrimination laws by alleging a burden on their religious
beliefs.145 For example, in arguing against same-sex marriages, those
groups have contended that “facilitating or assisting individuals to
138. David Johnson and Katy Steinmetz, This Map Shows Every State with ReligiousFreedom Laws, TIME (Apr. 2, 2015), http://time.com/3766173/religious-freedom-laws-map
-timeline.
139. Id.
140. Mariano Castillo, Five Things You Haven’t Considered About Indiana’s Religious
Freedom Law, CNN (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/01/politics/indiana
-religion-law-text.
141. Id.
142. Garrett Epps, What Makes Indiana’s Religious-Freedom Law Different?, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/what-makes-indianas
-religious-freedom-law-different/388997.
143. IND. CODE § 34-13-9-9 (2015).
144. Castillo, supra note 140.
145. Friedman, supra note 56.
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enter other kinds of marital relationships requires them to act in
contravention of their religious beliefs.”146 Many worry that if this
continues, states will use their respective RFRAs to combat nondiscrimination laws and provide legal cover for stores that refuse to
serve LGBT customers or employers who fire LBGT employees.147
It is not a far stretch to predict that this problem could extend beyond
the LGBT community to justify and protect actions of racial and
gender discrimination.
Addressing the Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee, the ACLU
outlined its opposition to the then proposed SB 568, Indiana’s
RFRA.148 The ACLU cited numerous examples of discrimination
justified under other states’ similar RFRA laws:149 First, a police
officer in Oklahoma refused to attend or even assign another officer
to attend a community relations event held at a mosque, claiming a
moral dilemma and substantial burden on his religious beliefs.150
Second, in several states, pharmacists used religious freedom as a
defense for refusing to dispense contraception.151 Furthermore, in
Michigan, a school guidance counselor refused to help gay students,
claiming a religious burden.152 Finally, plaintiffs have challenged
even commonplace regulations such as wearing a hardhat or
providing a social security number as violations of religious liberties
under some state RFRAs.153
Although not all state RFRAs include Indiana’s drastic
language, they do center around the federal RFRA’s flawed
substantial burden test.154 Pennsylvania’s RFRA, for example, not
146. Id.
147. Johnson & Steinmetz, supra note 138.
148. SB 101 and SB 568—Indiana’s “Religious Freedom Restoration Act” (RFRA): Hearing
on SB 101 and SB 568 Before the Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee (Ind. 2015) (statement of
Jane Henegar, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana), http://www.aclu
-in.org/images/newsReleases/RFRA_testimony_w_edits_2-9-15.pdf.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Fields v. City of Tulsa, 753 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 2014)).
151. Id. (citing Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate, WASH. POST (Mar.
28, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5490-2005Mar27.html).
152. Id. (citing Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011)).
153. Id. (citing Kalsi v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d,
189 F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999) and Harris v. Bus., Transp. & Hous. Agency, No. C 07-0459 PJH,
2007 WL 1140667 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007)).
154. See 71 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West 2002); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1493.01 (2016) (“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is both: (1) In furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest. (2) The least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2013) (“The right to act or
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only requires a “substantial burden,” but unlike the federal RFRA
goes on to define it as
[a]n agency action which does any of the following:
(1) Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or
expression mandated by a person’s sincerely held religious
beliefs; (2) Significantly curtails a person’s ability to
express adherence to the person’s religious faith; (3) Denies
a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities
which are fundamental to the person’s religion; [or]
(4) Compels conduct or expression which violates a specific
tenet of a person’s religious faith.155
Some states, such as Alabama, don’t even require the burden
imposed by a law to be substantial, thereby lowering the threshold
requirement to bring a RFRA claim even further.156 Therefore, the
main differences between the federal and state RFRAs are that many
states have gone beyond the federal RFRA in their laws and made it
even easier for plaintiffs to win RFRA claims.
B. Benefits of Applying Title VII to State RFRAs
The main purpose of the above-proposed changes to RFRA is to
balance out the two prongs of the analysis and eliminate the
impossible-to-apply substantial burden test. Because many state
RFRAs create an even greater imbalance between the prongs than
exists in the federal RFRA, Title VII’s application on the state level
is arguably even more important.
These state RFRAs are all relatively new and therefore have not
gone through the long sequence of judicial interpretation that the
federal RFRA has. However, it is foreseeable that the same problems
will eventually arise. The trends in amendments to state RFRAs
seem to already mimic changes that have occurred over time to the
federal RFRA. For example, the Indiana RFRA as initially written
applied to both for-profit and non-profit religious organizations prior
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, which extended
the federal RFRA’s application to closely held corporations and
refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief may not be substantially
burdened unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling
governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least
restrictive means to further that interest.”).
155. 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West 2002).
156. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01.
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individuals.157
Application of Title VII to the federal RFRA without further
application to state RFRAs will not completely solve the problem.
Because both types of RFRAs involve the same substantial burden
requirement, the only way to address the overarching issue is to
amend the RFRA framework across the board. This would require
Congress to amend the federal RFRA in addition to state legislatures
individually amending their own versions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite Congress’s good intentions to restore protections against
religious discrimination post-Smith, courts have analyzed the federal
RFRA in a way that causes more harm than good. They have
lowered the threshold for establishing a RFRA claim to the point that
any burden would be considered substantial simply at a plaintiff’s
say-so. In a two-pronged framework, a low burden on a plaintiff in
the first prong must be balanced out with a higher burden in the
second. However, under the current interpretation of RFRA, the
burden remains low for a plaintiff in both prongs. The second phase
of analysis imposes a very high burden on the government to prove
that the law was the least restrictive method of achieving a
compelling government interest. This entire framework is far too
plaintiff-friendly in that plaintiffs can rest entirely on the
government’s failure to meet its high burden of proof without having
to prove anything about the actual burden they claim to suffer.
In Little Sisters, the Tenth Circuit finally showed a willingness
to address this problem, but it was limited by the reasoning in
existing case law. It could only make a proper ruling by deviating
from the logic used in Hobby Lobby. Because of the flawed prior
analysis, the only way to fully address this problem is to amend
RFRA and create a new framework modeled after the reasonable
accommodation analysis used in Title VII cases. This change would
create needed balance between the two prongs of the test—the
plaintiff’s establishment of a prima facie claim and the defendant’s
justification for its actions—to simplify the analytical framework to
allow for more consistent application of the statute.
Simply applying this proposed change to the federal RFRA
however, will not properly address the overall issue. Because states
157. RFRA, supra note 6.
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continue to enact their own state RFRAs, religious groups would still
be able to easily evade compliance with crucial laws on the state
level, particularly anti-discrimination laws. The underlying issue of
religious groups using their beliefs as a means to avoid compliance
with laws can therefore only be fully addressed if the aboveproposed changes are applied on both the federal and state levels.
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